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Abstract
Empirical adversarial risk minimization (EARM) is a widely used mathematical frame-
work to robustly train deep neural nets (DNNs) that are resistant to adversarial attacks.
However, both natural and robust accuracies, in classifying clean and adversarial images,
respectively, of the trained robust models are far from satisfactory. In this work, we unify the
theory of optimal control of transport equations with the practice of training and testing of
ResNets. Based on this unified viewpoint, we propose a simple yet effective ResNets ensemble
algorithm to boost the accuracy of the robustly trained model on both clean and adversarial
images. The proposed algorithm consists of two components: First, we modify the base
ResNets by injecting a variance specified Gaussian noise to the output of each residual map-
ping. Second, we average over the production of multiple jointly trained modified ResNets to
get the final prediction. These two steps give an approximation to the Feynman-Kac formula
for representing the solution of a transport equation with viscosity, or a convection-diffusion
equation. For the CIFAR10 benchmark, this simple algorithm leads to a robust model with
a natural accuracy of 85.62% on clean images and a robust accuracy of 57.94% under
the 20 iterations of the IFGSM attack, which outperforms the current state-of-the-art in
defending against IFGSM attack on the CIFAR10. Both natural and robust accuracies of
the proposed ResNets ensemble can be improved dynamically as the building block ResNet
advances. The code is available at: https://github.com/BaoWangMath/EnResNet.
1 Introduction
Deep learning (DL) achieves great success in image and speech perception [32]. Residual learning
revolutionizes the deep neural nets (DNNs) architecture design and makes training of the ultra-
deep, up to more than one thousand layers, DNNs practical [21]. The idea of residual learning
motivates the development of a good number of related powerful DNNs, e.g., Pre-activated
ResNet [22], ResNeXt [56], DenseNet [23], and many others. Neural nets ensemble is a learning
paradigm where many DNNs are jointly used to improve the performance of individual DNNs
[20].
Despite the extraordinary success of DNNs in image and speech recognition, their vulnerability
to adversarial attacks raises concerns when applying them to security-critical tasks, e.g., au-
tonomous cars [3, 1], robotics [18], and DNN-based malware detection systems [42, 17]. Since the
seminal work of Szegedy et al. [51], recent research shows that DNNs are vulnerable to many kinds
of adversarial attacks including physical, poisoning, and inference attacks [11, 9, 41, 16, 24, 6, 5].
The physical attacks occur during the data acquisition, the poisoning and inference attacks
happen during the training and testing phases of machine learning (ML), respectively.
The adversarial attacks have been successful in both white-box and black-box scenarios. In
white-box attacks, the adversarial attacks have access to the architecture and weights of the
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DNNs. In black-box attacks, the attacks have no access to the details of the underlying model.
Black-box attacks are successful because one can perturb an image to cause its misclassification
on one DNN, and the same perturbed image also has a significant chance to be misclassified
by another DNN; this is known as transferability of adversarial examples [43]. Due to this
transferability, it is straightforward to attack DNNs in a black-box fashion [36, 7]. There exist
universal perturbations that can imperceptibly perturb any image and cause misclassification for
any given network [39]. Dou et al. [13], analyzed the efficiency of many adversarial attacks for a
large variety of DNNs. Recently, there has been much work on defending against these universal
perturbations [4].
The empirical adversarial risk minimization (EARM) is one of the most successful mathe-
matical frameworks for certified adversarial defense. Under the EARM framework, adversarial
defense for `∞ norm based inference attacks can be formulated as solving the following EARM
[38, 57]
min
f∈H
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
‖x′i−xi‖∞≤
L(f(x′i,w), yi), (1)
where f(·,w) is a function in the hypothesis class H, e.g., ResNets, parameterized by w. Here,
{(xi, yi)}ni=1 are n i.i.d. data-label pairs drawn from some high dimensional unknown distribution
D, L(f(xi,w), yi) is the loss associated with f on the data-label pair (xi, yi). For classification,
L is typically selected to be the cross-entropy loss; for regression, the root mean square error
is commonly used. The adversarial defense for other measure based attacks can be formulated
similarly. As a comparison, empirical risk minimization (ERM) is used to train models in a
natural fashion that generalize well on the clean data, where ERM is to solve the following
optimization problem
min
f∈H
1
n
n∑
i=1
L(f(xi,w), yi). (2)
Many of the existing works try to defend against the inference attacks by finding a good
approximation to the loss function in EARM. Project gradient descent (PGD) adversarial
training is a representative work along this side that approximate EARM by replacing x′i with the
adversarial data that obtained by applying the PGD attack to the clean data [16, 38, 40]. Zhang
et al. [59] replace the empirical adversarial risk by a linear combination of empirical and empirical
adversarial risks. Besides finding a good surrogate to approximate the empirical adversarial risk,
under the EARM framework, we can also improve the hypothesis class to improve the adversarial
robustness of the trained robust models.
1.1 Our Contribution
The robustly trained DNNs usually more resistant to adversarial attacks, however, they are much
less accurate on clean images than the naturally trained models. A natural question is
Can we improve both natural and robust accuracies of the robustly trained DNNs?
In this work, we unify the training and testing of ResNets with the theory of transport
equations (TEs). This unified viewpoint enables us to interpret the adversarial vulnerability
of ResNets as the irregularity, which will be defined later, of the TE’s solution. Based on this
observation, we propose a new ResNets ensemble algorithm based on the Feynman-Kac formula.
In a nutshell, the proposed algorithm consists of two essential components. First, for each
l = 1, 2, · · · ,M with M being the number of residual mappings in the ResNet, we modify the
l-th residual mapping from xl+1 = xl + F(xl) (Fig. 1 (a)) to xl+1 = xl + F(xl) + N(0, σ2I)
(Fig. 1 (b)), where xl is the input, F is the residual mapping and N(0, σ2I) is Gaussian noise
with a specially designed variance σ2. Second, we average over multiple jointly and robustly
trained modified ResNets’ outputs to get the final prediction (Fig. 2). This ensemble algorithm
improves the base model’s accuracy on both clean and adversarial data. The advantages of the
proposed algorithm are summarized as follows:
• It outperforms the current state-of-the-art in defending against inference attacks.
• It improves the natural accuracy of the adversarially trained models.
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• Its defense capability can be improved dynamically as the base ResNet advances.
• It enables to train and integrate an ultra-large DNN for adversarial defense with a limited
GPU memory.
• It is motivated from partial differential equation (PDE) theory, which introduces a new
way to defend against adversarial attacks, and it is a complement to many other existing
adversarial defenses.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Residual mapping of the ResNet. (b) Gaussian noise injected residual mapping
with σ being the variance.
Figure 2: Architecture of the EnResNet.
1.2 Related Work
There is a massive volume of research over the last several years on defending against adversarial
attacks for DNNs. Randomized smoothing transforms an arbitrary classifier f into a "smoothed"
surrogate classifier g and is certifiably robust in `2 norm based adversarial attacks [34, 33, 12, 54, 8].
Among the randomized smoothing, one of the most popular ideas is to inject Gaussian noise to
the input image and the classification result is based on the probability of the noisy image in
the decision region. Our adversarial defense algorithm injects noise into each residual mapping
instead of the input image, which is different from randomized smoothing.
Robust optimization for solving EARM achieves great success in defending against inference
attacks [38, 44, 45, 55, 47]. Regularization in EARM can further boost the robustness of the
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adversarially trained models [57, 30, 46, 60]. The adversarial defense algorithms should learn a
classifier with high test accuracy on both clean and adversarial data. To achieve this goal, Zhang
et al. [59] developed a new loss function, TRADES, that explicitly trades off between natural
and robust generalization. To the best our of knowledge, TRADES is the current state-of-the-art
in defending against inference attacks on the CIFAR10. Throughout this paper, we regard
TRADES as the benchmark.
Modeling DNNs as ordinary differential equations (ODEs) has drawn lots of attention recently.
Chen et al. proposed neural ODEs for DL [10]. E [14] modeled training ResNets as solving an
ODE optimal control problem. Haber and Ruthotto [19] constructed stable DNN architectures
based on the properties of numerical ODEs. Lu, Zhu and et al. [37, 61] constructed novel
architectures for DNNs, which were motivated from the numerical discretization schemes for
ODEs. Sun et al. [50] modeled training of ResNets as solving a stochastic differential equation.
Model averaging with multiple stochastically trained identical DNNs is the most straightfor-
ward ensemble technique to improve the predictive power of base DNNs. This simple averaging
method has been a success in image classification for ILSVRC competitions. Different groups of
researchers use model averaging for different base DNNs and won different ILSVRC competitions
[29, 48, 21]. This widely used unweighted averaging ensemble, however, is not data-adaptive and
is sensitive to the presence of excessively biased base learners. Ju et al., recently investigated
ensemble of DNNs by many different ensemble methods, including unweighted averaging, majority
voting, the Bayes Optimal Classifier, and the (discrete) Super Learner, for image recognition
tasks. They concluded that the Super Learner achieves the best performance among all the
studied ensemble algorithms [25].
Our work distinguishes from the existing work on DNN ensemble and feature and input
smoothing from two major points: First, we inject Gaussian noise to each residual mapping
in the ResNet. Second, we jointly train each component of the ensemble instead of using a
sequential training.
1.3 Organization
We organize this paper in the following way: In section 2, we model the ResNet as a TE and
give an explanation for ResNet’s adversarial vulnerability. In section 3, we present a new ResNet
ensemble algorithm that motivated from the Feynman-Kac formula for adversarial defense. In
section 4, we present the natural accuracy of the EnResNets and their robust accuracy under
both white-box and blind PGD and C&W attacks, and compare with the current state-of-the-art.
In section 5, we generalize the algorithm to ensemble of different neural nets and numerically
verify its efficacy. Our paper ends up with some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Motivation and Guarantees
2.1 Transport Equation Modeling of ResNets
The connection between training ResNet and solving optimal control problems of the TE is
investigated in [52, 53, 35]. In this section, we derive the TE model for ResNet and explain its
adversarial vulnerability from a PDE viewpoint. The TE model enables us to understand the
data flow of the entire training and testing data in both forward and backward propagation in
training and testing of ResNets; whereas, the ODE models focus on the dynamics of individual
data points [10].
As shown in Fig. 1 (a), residual mapping adds a skip connection to connect the input and
output of the original mapping (F), and the l-th residual mapping can be written as
xl+1 = F(xl,wl) + xl,
with x0 = xˆ ∈ T ⊂ Rd being a data point in the set T , xl and xl+1 are the input and output
tensors of the residual mapping. The parameters wl can be learned by back-propagating the
training error. For ∀ xˆ ∈ T with label y, the forward propagation of ResNet can be written as{
xl+1 = xl + F(xl,wl), l = 0, 1, . . . , L− 1, with x0 = xˆ,
yˆ
.
= f(xL),
(3)
4
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Figure 3: (a) A detailed structure of the residual mapping in the pre-activated ResNet. (b)
Demonstration of characteristic curves of the transport equation.
where yˆ is the predicted label, L is the number of layers, and f(x) = softmax(w0 · x) be the
output activation with w0 being the trainable parameters. For the widely used residual mapping
in the pre-activated ResNet [22], as shown in Fig. 3 (a), we have
F(xl,wl) = wC2l ⊗ σ(wB2l wC1l ⊗ σ(wB1l  xl)), (4)
where wC1l (w
B1
l ) and w
C2
l (w
B2
l ) are the first and second convolutional (batch normalization)
layers of the l-th residual mapping, respectively, from top to bottom order. ⊗ and  are the
convolutional and batch normalization operators, respectively.
Next, we introduce a temporal partition: let tl = l/L, for l = 0, 1, · · · , L, with the time
interval ∆t = 1/L. Without considering dimensional consistency, we regard xl in Eq. (3) as the
value of x(t) at the time slot tl, so Eq. (3) can be rewritten as{
x(tl+1) = x(tl) + ∆t · F (x(tl),w(tl)), l = 0, 1, . . . , L− 1, with x(0) = xˆ
yˆ
.
= f(x(1)),
(5)
where F .= 1∆tF . Eq. (5) is the forward Euler discretization of the following ODE
dx(t)
dt
= F (x(t),w(t)), x(0) = xˆ. (6)
Let u(x, t) be a function that is constant along the trajectory defined by Eq. (6), as demonstrated
in Fig. 3 (b), then u(x, t) satisfies the following TE
d
dt
(u(x(t), t)) =
∂u
∂t
(x, t) + F (x,w(t)) · ∇u(x, t) = 0, x ∈ Rd, (7)
the first equality is because of the chain rule and the second equality dues to the fact that u is
constant along the curve defined by Eq. (6).
If we enforce the terminal condition at t = 1 for Eq. (7) to be
u(x, 1) = softmax(w0 · x) := f(x),
then according to the fact that u(x, t) is constant along the curve defined by Eq. (6) (which is called
the characteristic curve for the TE defined in Eq. (7)), we have u(xˆ, 0) = u(x(1), 1) = f(x(1));
therefore, the forward propagation of ResNet for xˆ can be modeled as computing u(xˆ, 0) along
the characteristic curve of the following TE{
∂u
∂t (x, t) + F (x,w(t)) · ∇u(x, t) = 0, x ∈ Rd,
u(x, 1) = f(x).
(8)
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Meanwhile, the backpropagation in training ResNets can be modeled as finding the velocity
field, F (x(t),w(t)), for the following control problem
∂u
∂t (x, t) + F (x,w(t)) · ∇u(x, t) = 0, x ∈ Rd,
u(x, 1) = f(x), x ∈ Rd,
u(xi, 0) = yi, xi ∈ T, with T,
(9)
where T is the training set that enforces the initial condition on the training data for the TE.
Note that in the above TE formulation of ResNet, u(x, 0) serves as the classifier and the velocity
field F (x,w(t)) encodes ResNet’s architecture and weights. When F is very complex, u(x, 0)
might be highly irregular i.e. a small change in the input x can lead to a massive change in
the value of u(x, 0). This irregular function may have a good generalizability on clean images,
but it is not robust to adversarial attacks. Fig. 4 (a) shows a 2D illustration of u(x, 0) with the
terminal condition u(x, 1) shown in Fig. 4 (d); we will discuss this in detail later in this section.
(a) σ = 0 (b) σ = 0.01
(c) σ = 0.1 (d) u(x, 1)
Figure 4: (d): terminal condition for Eq. (10); (a), (b), and (c): solutions of the convection-
diffusion equation, Eq. (10), at t = 0 with different diffusion coefficients σ.
2.2 Improving Robustness via Diffusion
Using a specific level set of u(x, 0) in Fig. 4 (a) for classification suffers from adversarial
vulnerability: A tiny perturbation in x will lead the output to go across the level set, thus leading
to misclassification. To mitigate this issue, we introduce a diffusion term 12σ
2∆u to Eq. (8), with
σ being the diffusion coefficient and
∆ =
∂2
∂x21
+
∂2
∂x22
+ · · ·+ ∂
2
∂x2d
,
is the Laplace operator in Rd. The newly introduced diffusion term makes the level sets of the
TE more regular. This improves adversarial robustness of the classifier. Hence, we arrive at the
following convection-diffusion equation{
∂u
∂t (x, t) + F (x,w(t)) · ∇u(x, t) + 12σ2∆u(x, t) = 0, x ∈ Rd, t ∈ [0, 1),
u(x, 1) = f(x).
(10)
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The solution of Eq. (10) is much more regular when σ 6= 0 than when σ = 0. We consider the
solution of Eq. (10) in a 2D unit square with periodic boundary conditions, and on each grid
point of the mesh the velocity field F (x,w(t)) is a random number sampled uniformly from
−1 to 1. The terminal condition is also randomly generated, as shown in Fig. 4 (d). This 2D
convection-diffusion equation is solved by the pseudo-spectral method with spatial and temporal
step sizes being 1/128 and 1×10−3, respectively. Figure 4 (a), (b), and (c) illustrate the solutions
when σ = 0, 0.01, and 0.1, respectively. These show that as σ increases, the solution becomes
more regular, which makes the classifier more robust, but might be less accurate on clean data.
The σ should be selected to have a good trade-off between accuracy and robustness. According
to the above observation, instead of using u(x, 0) of the TE’s solution for classification, we use
that of the convection-diffusion equation.
2.3 Theoretical Guarantees for the Surrogate Model
We have the following theoretical guarantee for robustness of the solution of the convection-
diffusion equation mentioned above.
Theorem 1. [31] Let F (x, t) be a Lipschitz function in both x and t, and f(x) be a bounded
function. Consider the following initial value problem of the convection-diffusion equation (σ 6= 0){
∂u
∂t (x, t) + F (x,w(t)) · ∇u(x, t) + 12σ2∆u(x, t) = 0, x ∈ Rd, t ∈ [0, 1),
u(x, 1) = f(x).
(11)
Then, for any small perturbation δ, we have |u(x+ δ, 0)−u(x, 0)| ≤ C
(
‖δ‖2
σ
)α
for some constant
α > 0 if σ ≤ 1. Here, ‖δ‖2 is the `2 norm of δ, and C is a constant that depends on d, ‖f‖∞,
and ‖F‖L∞x,t . The meaning of notations ‖f‖∞ and ‖F‖L∞x,t can be found in [31].
Furthermore, we have the following bound for the gradient of the solution of the convection-
diffusion equation.
Theorem 2. Let u0(x) be a compactly supported function and F ∈ C1(Rd × [0, 1]). For the
following initial value problem of the convection-diffusion equation{
∂u
∂t (x, t) + F (x,w(t)) · ∇u(x, t) = 12σ2∆u(x, t), x ∈ Rd, t ∈ [0, 1),
u(x, 0) = u0(x),
(12)
we have
‖∇u(x, 1)‖∞ ≤ e−σ2eγ (‖u0‖∞ + ‖∇u0‖∞) , (13)
where γ is a constant depends on ∇F .
Proof. Let w(x, t) =
(
µu2(x, t) + ‖∇u(x, t)‖2) e−2λt, where µ and λ are constants which will be
defined later.
Note that u2(x, t) satisfies
∂(u2)
∂t
+ F (x, t) · ∇(u2) = σ2∆(u2)− 2σ2‖∇u‖2,
and ‖∇u‖2 satisfies
∂‖∇u‖2
∂t
+ F (x, t) · ∇‖∇u‖2 = −2∇u · ∇F · ∇u+ σ2∆‖∇u‖2 − 2σ2‖∇∇u‖2F ,
therefore,
∂w
∂t
+ F · ∇w − σ2∇w = e−2λt [−2λ(µu2 + ‖∇u‖2)− 2µσ2‖∇u‖2 − 2∇u · ∇F · ∇u− 2σ2‖∇∇u‖2F ] .
Next, let γ(x, t) = min‖ξ‖=1 ξ · ∇F · ξ and γ = −minx,t γ(x, t), then we have
Lw :=
∂w
∂t
+ F · ∇w − σ2∇w ≤ −2e−2λt [λµu2 + (λ+ µσ2 − γ)‖∇u‖2] .
7
If we choose λ and µ large enough, such that λ+ µσ − γ ≥ 0, then
Lw ≤ 0.
From the maximum principle, we know maxx w(x, 1) ≤ maxx w(x, 0), i.e.,
max
x
e−2λ
(
µu2(x, 1) + ‖∇u(x, 1)‖2) ≤ max
x
(
µu2(x, 0) + ‖∇u(x, 0)‖2) .
Hence,
‖∇u(x, 1)‖2∞ ≤ e2λ
(
µ‖u0‖2∞ + ‖∇u0‖2∞
)
.
Let µ = 1 and λ = γ − σ2, we have
‖∇u(x, 1)‖∞ ≤ e−σ2 (eγ‖u0‖∞ + eγ‖∇u0‖∞) .
Remark 1. Similar estimate in Theorem 2 can be established on u(x, 0) for the terminal value
problem of the convection diffusion equation in Eq. (11) by reverse time.
3 Algorithms
3.1 ResNets Ensemble via the Feynman-Kac Formula
Based on the above discussion, if we use the solution of the convection-diffusion equation, Eq. (10),
for classification. The resulted classifier will be more resistant to adversarial attacks. In this
part, we will present an ensemble of ResNets to approximate the solution of Eq. (10). In the
Section. 4, we will verify that the robustly trained special ensemble of ResNets is more accurate
on both clean and adversarial images than standard ResNets.
The convection-diffusion equation, Eq. (10), can be solved using the Feynman-Kac formula
[26] in high dimensional space, which gives u(xˆ, 0) as
u(xˆ, 0) = E [f(x(1))|x(0) = xˆ] , (14)
where x(t) is an Itô process,
dx(t) = F (x(t),w(t))dt+ σdBt,
and u(xˆ, 0) is the conditional expectation of f(x(1)).
Next, we approximate the Feynman-Kac formula by an ensemble of modified ResNets in
the following way: Accoding to the Euler-Maruyama method [2], the term σdBt in the Itô
process that can be approximated by adding a specially designed Gaussian noise, σN (0, I),
where σ = a
√
Var(xl + F(xl)) with a being a tunable parameter, to each original residual
mapping xl+1 = xl + F(xl) in the ResNet. This gives the modified residual mapping xl+1 =
xl + F(xl) + σN (0, I), as illustrated in Fig. 1 (b). Let ResNet’ denote the modified ResNet
where we inject noise to each residual mapping of the original ResNet. In a nutshell, ResNet’s
approximation to the Feynman-Kac formula is an ensemble of jointly trained ResNet’ as illustrated
in Fig. 1 (c). 1 We call this ensemble of ResNets as EnResNet. For instance, if the base ResNet
is ResNet20, an ensemble of n ResNet20 is denoted as EnnResNet20.
3.2 Adversarial Attacks
In this subsection, we review a few widely used adversarial attacks. These attacks will be used
to train robust EnResNets and attack the trained models. We attack the trained model, f(x,w),
by `∞ norm based (the other norm based attacks can be formulated similarly) untargeted fast
gradient sign method (FGSM), iterative FGSM (IFGSM) [16], and Carlini-Wagner (C&W) [9]
attacks in both white-box and blind fashions. In blind attacks, we use the target model to classify
the adversarial images crafted by attacking the oracle model in a white-box approach. For a
given instance (x, y):
1To ease the notation, in what follows, we use ResNet in place of ResNet’ when there is no ambiguity.
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• FGSM searches the adversarial image x′ by maximizing the loss function L(x′, y) .=
L(f(x′,w), y), subject to the constraint ||x′ − x||∞ ≤  with  being the maximum
perturbation. For the linearized loss function, L(x′, y) ≈ L(x, y) +∇xL(x, y)T · (x′ − x),
the optimal adversarial is
x′ = x+  · sign (∇xL(x, y)) . (15)
• IFGSM, Eq. (16), iterates FGSM with step size α and clips the perturbed image to generate
the enhanced adversarial attack,
x(m) = Clipx,{x(m−1) + α · sign(∇xL(x(m−1), y))}, (16)
where m = 1, · · · ,M , x(0) = x, and let the adversarial image be x′ = x(M) with M being
the total number of iterations.
• C&W attack searches the targeted adversarial image by solving
min
δ
||δ||∞, subject to f(w,x+ δ) = t, x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]d, (17)
where δ is the adversarial perturbation and t is the target label. Carlini et al. [9] proposed
the following approximation to Eq. (17),
min
u
||1
2
(tanh(u) + 1)− x||∞ + (18)
c ·max
{
−κ,max
i 6=t
(Z(
1
2
(tanh(u)) + 1)i)− Z(1
2
(tanh(u)) + 1)t
}
,
where Z(·) is the logit vector for the input, i.e., the output of the DNN before the softmax
layer. This unconstrained optimization problem can be solved efficiently by using the
Adam optimizer [27]. Dou et al. [13], prove that, under a certain regime, C&W can shift
the DNNs’ predicted probability distribution to the desired one.
All three attacks clip the pixel values of the adversarial image to between 0 and 1. In the
following experiments, we set  = 8/255 in both FGSM and IFGSM attacks. Additionally, in
IFGSM we set m = 20 and α = 2/255, and denote it as IFGSM20. For C&W attack, we run 50
iterations of Adam with learning rate 6× 10−4 and set c = 10 and κ = 0.
3.3 Robust Training of EnResNets
We use the PGD adversarial training [38], i.e., solving EARM Eq. (1) by replacing x′ with the
PGD adversarial one, to robustly train EnResNets with σ = 0.1 on both CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
[28] benchmarks with standard data augmentation [21]. The attack in the PGD adversarial
training is merely IFGSM with an initial random perturbation on the clean data. We summarize
the PGD based robust training for EnResNets in Algorithm 1. Other methods to solve EARM
can also be used to train EnResNets, e.g., approximation to the adversarial risk function and
regularization. EnResNet enriches the hypothesis class H, to make the classifiers from H more
adversarially robust. All computations are carried out on a machine with a single Nvidia Titan
Xp graphics card.
4 Numerical Results
In this section, we numerically verify that the robustly trained EnResNets are more accurate, on
both clean and adversarial data of the CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, than robustly trained ResNets
and ensemble of ResNets without noise injection. To avoid the gradient mask issue of EnResNets
due to the noise injection in each residual mapping, we use the Expectation over Transformation
(EOT) strategy [6] to compute the gradient which is averaged over five independent runs.
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Algorithm 1 Training of the EnResNet by PGD Adversarial Training
Input: Training set: (Xi,Yi)NBi=1, NB = #minibatches, perturbation , and step size α.
Output: A robustly trained EnNResNet, i.e., an ensemble of N modified ResNets.
for i = 1, . . . , NE (where NE is the number of epochs.) do
for j = 1,. . . , NB do
//PGD attack
Add uniform noise in the range [−, ] to Xi, denote the resulted images as X˜i.
Attack X˜i by 10 iterations IFGSM attacks with maximum perturbation  and step size
α. And denote the adversarial images as X′i.
//Forward-propagation
Generate prediction Y˜i = EnNResNet(X′i) for X′i by the current model EnNResNet.
//Back-propagation
Back-Propagate the cross-entropy loss between Yi and Y˜i to update the model
EnResNetN .
Table 1: Natural accuracies of naturally trained ResNet20 and different ensemble of noise
injected ResNet20 on the CIFAR10 dataset. Unit: %.
Model dataset Anat
ResNet20 CIFAR10 92.10
En1ResNet20 CIFAR10 92.59
En2ResNet20 CIFAR10 92.60
En5ResNet20 CIFAR10 92.74
ResNet44 CIFAR10 93.22
En1ResNet44 CIFAR10 93.37
En2ResNet44 CIFAR10 93.54
ResNet110 CIFAR10 94.30
En2ResNet110 CIFAR10 93.49
4.1 Natural and Robust Accuracies of Robustly Trained EnResNets
In robust training, we run 200 epochs of the PGD adversarial training (10 iterations of IFGSM
with α = 2/255 and  = 8/255, and an initial random perturbation of magnitude ) with initial
learning rate 0.1, which decays by a factor of 10 at the 80th, 120th, and 160th epochs. The
training data is split into 45K/5K for training and validation, the model with the best validation
accuracy is used for testing. Similar settings are used for natural training, i.e., solving the ERM
problem Eq. (2). En1ResNet20 denotes the ensemble of only one ResNet20 which is merely
adding noise to each residual mapping, and similar notations apply to other DNNs.
First, we show that the ensemble of noise injected ResNets can improve the natural general-
ization of the naturally trained models. As shown in Table 1, the naturally trained ensemble of
multiple ResNets are always generalize better on the clean images than the base ResNets. This
conclusion is verified by ResNet20, ResNet44, and ResNet110. However, the natural accuracy
of the robustly trained models are much less than that of the naturally trained models. For
instance, the natural accuracies of the robustly trained and naturally trained ResNet20 are,
respectively, 75.11% and 92.10%. The degradation of natural accuracies in robust training are
also confirmed by experiments on ResNet44 (78.89% v.s. 93.22%) and ResNet110 (82.19% v.s.
94.30%). Improving natural accuracy of the robustly trained models is another important issue
during adversarial defense.
Second, consider natural (Anat) and robust (Arob) accuracies of the PGD adversarially trained
models on the CIFAR10, where Anat and Arob are measured on clean and adversarial images,
respectively. All results are listed in Table 2. The robustly trained ResNet20 has accuracies
50.89%, 46.03% (close to that reported in [38]), and 58.73%, respectively, under the FGSM,
IFGSM20, and C&W attacks. Moreover, it has a natural accuracy of 75.11%. En5ResNet20
boosts natural accuracy to 82.52%, and improves the corresponding robust accuracies to 58.92%,
51.48%, and 67.73%, respectively. Simply injecting noise to each residual mapping of ResNet20
can increase Anat by ∼ 2% and Arob by ∼ 3% under the IFGSM20 attack. The advantages of
EnResNets are also verified by experiments on ResNet44, ResNet110, and their ensembles. Note
that ensemble of high capacity ResNet is more robust than low capacity model: as shown in
Table 2, En2ResNet110 is more accurate than En2ResNet44 which in turn is more accurate
than En2ResNet20 in classifying both clean and adversarial images. The robustly trained
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Figure 5: Evolution of training and validation accuracy. (a): ResNet20 and different ensembles
of noise injected ResNet20. (b): ResNet44 and different ensembles of noise injected ResNet44.
En1WideResNet34-10 has 86.19% and 56.60%, respectively, natural and robust accuracies under
the IFGSM20 attack. Compared with the current state-of-the-art [59], En1WideResNet34-10 has
almost the same robust accuracy (56.60% v.s. 56.61%) under the IFGSM20 attack but better
natural accuracy (86.19% v.s. 84.92%). Figure 5 plots the evolution of training and validation
accuracies of ResNet20 and ResNet44 and their different ensembles.
Table 2: Natural and robust accuracies of different base and noise injected ensembles of robustly
trained ResNets on the CIFAR10. Unit: %.
Model dataset Anat Arob (FGSM) Arob (IFGSM20) Arob (C&W)
ResNet20 CIFAR10 75.11 50.89 46.03 58.73
En1ResNet20 CIFAR10 77.21 55.35 49.06 65.69
En2ResNet20 CIFAR10 80.34 57.23 50.06 66.47
En5ResNet20 CIFAR10 82.52 58.92 51.48 67.73
ResNet44 CIFAR10 78.89 54.54 48.85 61.33
En1ResNet44 CIFAR10 82.03 57.80 51.83 66.00
En2ResNet44 CIFAR10 82.91 58.29 51.86 66.89
ResNet110 CIFAR10 82.19 57.61 52.02 62.92
En2ResNet110 CIFAR10 82.43 59.24 53.03 68.67
En1WideResNet34-10 CIFAR10 86.19 61.82 56.60 69.32
Third, consider accuracy of the robustly trained models under blind attacks. In this scenario,
we use the target model to classify the adversarial images crafted by applying FGSM, IFGSM20,
and C&W attacks to the oracle model. As listed in Table 3, EnResNets are always more robust
than the base ResNets under different blind attacks. For instance, when En5ResNet20 is used
to classify adversarial images crafted by attacking ResNet20 with FGSM, IFGSM20, and C&W
attacks, the accuracies are 64.07%, 62.99%, and 76.57%, respectively. Conversely, the accuracies
of ResNet20 are only 61.69%, 58.74%, and 73.77%, respectively, in classifying adversarial images
obtained by using the above three attacks to attack En5ResNet20.
Table 3: Accuracies of robustly trained models on adversarial images of CIFAR10 crafted by
attacking the oracle model with different attacks. Unit: %.
Model dataset Oracle Arob (FGSM) Arob (IFGSM20) Arob (C&W)
ResNet20 CIFAR10 En5ResNet20 61.69 58.74 73.77
En5ResNet20 CIFAR10 ResNet20 64.07 62.99 76.57
ResNet44 CIFAR10 En2ResNet44 63.87 60.66 75.83
En2ResNet44 CIFAR10 ResNet44 64.52 61.23 76.99
ResNet110 CIFAR10 En2ResNet110 64.19 61.80 75.19
En2ResNet110 CIFAR10 ResNet110 66.26 62.89 77.71
Fourth, we perform experiments on the CIFAR100 to further verify the efficiency of EnResNets
in defending against adversarial attacks. Table 4 lists the naturally accuracies of the naturally
trained ResNets and their ensembles, again, the ensemble can improve natural accuracies. Table 5
lists natural and robust accuracies of robustly trained ResNet20, ResNet44, and their ensembles
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Table 4: Natural accuracies of naturally trained ResNet20 and different ensemble of noise
injected ResNet20 on the CIFAR100 dataset. Unit: %.
Model dataset Anat
ResNet20 CIFAR100 68.53
ResNet44 CIFAR100 71.48
En2ResNet20 CIFAR100 69.57
En5ResNet20 CIFAR100 70.22
under white-box attacks. The robust accuracy under the blind attacks is listed in Table 6.
The natural accuracy of the PGD adversarially trained baseline ResNet20 is 46.02%, and it
has robust accuracies 24.77%, 23.23%, and 32.42% under FGSM, IFGSM20, and C&W attacks,
respectively. En5ResNet20 increases them to 51.72%, 31.64%, 27.80%, and 40.44%, respectively.
The ensemble of ResNets is more effective in defending against adversarial attacks than making
the ResNets deeper. For instance, En2ResNet20 that has ∼ 0.27M × 2 parameters is much more
robust to adversarial attacks, FGSM (30.20% v.s. 28.40%), IFGSM20 (26.25% v.s. 25.81%), and
C&W (40.06% v.s. 36.06%), than ResNet44 with ∼ 0.66M parameters. Under blind attacks,
En2ResNet20 is also significantly more robust to different attacks where the opponent model
is used to generate adversarial images. Under the same model and computation complexity,
EnResNets is more robust to adversarial images and more accurate on clean images than deeper
nets.
Table 5: Natural and robust accuracies of robustly trained ResNet20 and different ensemble of noise
injected ResNet20 on the CIFAR100. Unit: %.
Model dataset Anat Arob (FGSM) Arob (IFGSM20) Arob (C&W)
ResNet20 CIFAR100 46.02 24.77 23.23 32.42
En2ResNet20 CIFAR100 50.68 30.20 26.25 40.06
En5ResNet20 CIFAR100 51.72 31.64 27.80 40.44
ResNet44 CIFAR100 50.38 28.40 25.81 36.06
Table 6: Accuracies of robustly trained models on the adversarial images of CIFAR100 crafted by
attacking the oracle model with different attacks. Unit: %.
Model dataset Oracle Arob (FGSM) Arob (IFGSM20) Arob (C&W)
ResNet20 CIFAR100 En2ResNet20 33.08 30.79 41.52
En2ResNet20 CIFAR100 ResNet20 34.15 33.34 48.21
Figure 6 depicts a few selected images from the CIFAR10 and their adversarial ones crafted
by applying either IFGSM20 or C&W attack to attack both ResNet20 and En5ResNet20. Both
adversarially trained ResNet20 and En5ResNet20 fail to correctly classify any of the adversarial
versions of these four images. For the deer image, it might also be difficult for human to
distinguish it from a horse.
4.2 Integration of Separately Trained EnResNets
In the previous subsection, we verified the adversarial defense capability of EnResNet, which is
an approximation to the Feynman-Kac formula to solve the convection-diffusion equation. As
we showed, when more ResNets and larger models are involved in the ensemble, both natural
and robust accuracies are improved. However, EnResNet proposed above requires to train the
ensemble jointly, which poses memory challenges for training ultra-large ensembles. To overcome
this issue, we consider training each component of the ensemble individually and integrating
them together for prediction. The major benefit of this strategy is that with the same amount
of GPU memory, we can train a much larger model for inference since the batch size used in
inference can be one.
Table 7 lists natural and robust accuracies of the integration of separately trained EnResNets
on the CIFAR10. The integration of separately trained EnResNets have better robust accuracy
than each component. For instance, the integration of En2ResNet110 and En1WideResNet34-10
gives a robust accuracy 57.94% under the IFGSM20 attack, which is remarkably better than
both En2ResNet110 (53.05%) and En1WideResNet34-10 (56.60%). To the best of our knowledge,
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Figure 6: Column 1: original images and labels; column 2-3 (4-5): adversarial images crafted
by using IFGSM20 and C&W to attack ResNet20 (En5ResNet20) and corresponding predicted
labels.
57.94% outperforms the current state-of-the-art [59] by 1.33%. The effectiveness of the integration
of separately trained EnResNets sheds light on the development of ultra-large models to improve
efficiency for adversarial defense.
Table 7: Natural and robust accuracies of different integration of different robustly trained EnResNets
on the CIFAR10. Unit: %.
Model dataset Anat Arob (FGSM) Arob (IFGSM20) Arob (C&W)
En2ResNet20&En5ResNet20 CIFAR10 82.82 59.14 53.15 68.00
En2ResNet44&En5ResNet20 CIFAR10 82.99 59.64 53.86 69.36
En2ResNet110&En5ResNet20 CIFAR10 83.57 60.63 54.87 70.02
En2ResNet110&En1WideResNet34-10 CIFAR10 85.62 62.48 57.94 70.20
4.3 Comparison with the Wide ResNet
In this subsection, we show that with the same number of parameters, EnResNets is more
adversarially robust that the Wide ResNets. We compare EnResNet220 with the wide-ResNet:
WRN-14-2 [58]. WRN-14-2 has ∼ 0.69M parameters which is more than that of EnResNet220.
We list natural and robust accuracies of the robustly trained models on the CIFAR10 benchmark
in Table. 8. En2ResNet20 has higher natural accuracy than WRN-14-2 (80.34% v.s. 78.37%).
Moreover, En2ResNet20 is more robust to both IFGSM20 and C&W attacks.
4.4 Gradient Mask and Comparison with Simple Ensembles
Besides applying EOT gradient, we further verify that our defense is not due to obfuscated
gradient. We use IFGSM20 to attack naturally trained (using the same approach as that used in
[21]) En1ResNet20, En2ResNet20, and En5ResNet20, and the corresponding accuracies are: 0%,
0.02%, and 0.03%, respectively. All naturally trained EnResNets are easily fooled by IFGSM20,
thus gradient mask does not play an important role in EnResNets for adversarial defense [5].
Ensemble of models for adversarial defense has been studied in [49]. Here, we show that
ensembles of robustly trained ResNets without noise injection cannot boost natural and robust
accuracy much. The natural accuracy of jointly (separately) adversarially trained ensemble of two
ResNet20 without noise injection is 75.75% (74.96%), which does not substantially outperform
ResNet20 with a natural accuracy 75.11%. The corresponding robust accuracies are 51.11%
(51.68%), 47.28% (47.86%), and 59.73% (59.80%), respectively, under the FGSM, IFGSM20, and
C&W attacks. These robust accuracies are much inferior to that of En2ResNet20. Furthermore,
the ensemble of separately trained robust ResNet20 and robust ResNet44 gives a natural accuracy
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Table 8: Natural and robust accuracies of robustly trained En2esNet20 and
WRN-14-2 on the CIFAR10 dataset. Unit: %.
Model dataset Anat Arob (FGSM) Arob (IFGSM20) Arob (C&W)
En2ResNet20 CIFAR10 80.34 57.23 50.06 66.47
WRN-14-2 CIFAR10 78.37 52.93 48.85 60.30
of 77.92%, and robust accuracies are 54.73%, 51.47%, 61.77% under the above three attacks.
These results reveal that ensemble adversarially trained ResNets via the Feynman-Kac formalism
is much more accurate than standard ensemble in both natural and robust generalizations.
5 Ensemble of Different ResNets
In previous sections, we proposed and numerically verifies the efficiency of the EnResNet, which
can be regarded as an Monte Carlo (MC) approximation to the Feynman-Kac formula that
used to solve the convection-diffusion equation. A straightforward extension is to solve the
convection-diffusion equation by the multi-level MC [15], which in turn can be simulated by an
ensemble of ResNets with different depths. In previous ensembles, we used the same weight for
each individual ResNet. However, in the ensemble of different ResNets, we learn the optimal
weight for each component. Here, we derive the formula to learn the optimal weights in the
cross-entropy loss setting.
Suppose we have an ensemble of two ResNets for n-class classification with training data
{xi, yi}Ni=1 where yi is the label of xi and N is the number of training data. Let the tensors
before the softmax output activation of two ResNet, respectively, be
y˜i =
(
y˜1i , y˜
2
i . . . , y˜
n
i
)
,
and
yˆi =
(
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2
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n
i
)
,
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The ensemble of these two ResNets gives the following output before the softmax output activation
for the i-th instance
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where w1 and w2 are the weights of the two ResNets, where we enforce w1 + w2 = 1. Hence, the
corresponding log-softmax for the i-th instance is
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Let L be the total cross-entropy loss on these N training data, then we have
∂L
∂w1
= −
N∑
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Table 9: Natural and robust accuracies of the robustly trained En2ResNet32
and En1ResNet20&En1ResNet32 on the CIFAR10 dataset. Unit: %.
Model dataset Anat Arob (IFGSM20) Arob (C&W)
En2ResNet32 CIFAR10 81.46 52.06 68.41
En1ResNet20&En1ResNet32 CIFAR10 81.56 51.99 68.62
Table 10: Natural and robust accuracies of the robustly trained En2ResNet32
and En1ResNet20&En1ResNet32 on the CIFAR100 dataset. Unit: %.
Model dataset Anat Arob (IFGSM20) Arob (C&W)
En2ResNet32 CIFAR100 53.14 27.27 41.50
En1ResNet20&En1ResNet32 CIFAR100 53.07 27.01 42.23
In implementation, we update these weights once per epoch during the training and normalize
the updated weights.
To show performance of ensembles of jointly trained different ResNets, we robustly train an
ensemble of noise injected ResNet20 and ResNet32 on both CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 benchmarks.
As shown in Tables 9 and 10, on CIFAR10 the ensemble of jointly trained noise injected ResNet20
and ResNet32 outperforms En2ResNet32 in classifying both clean (81.46% v.s. 81.56%) and
adversarial images of C&W attack (68.41% v.s. 68.62%). On CIFAR100, performances of
the ensemble of jointly trained noise injected ResNet20 and ResNet32 and En2ResNet32 are
comparable.
6 Concluding Remarks
Motivated by the transport equation modeling of the ResNet and the Feynman-Kac formula, we
proposed a novel ensemble algorithm for ResNets. The proposed ensemble algorithm consists of
two components: injecting Gaussian noise to each residual mapping of ResNet, and averaging over
multiple jointly and robustly trained baseline ResNets. Numerical results on the CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100 show that our ensemble algorithm improves both natural and robust generalization
of the robustly trained models. Our approach is a complement to many existing adversarial
defenses, e.g., regularization based approaches for adversarial training [59]. It is of interesting to
explore the regularization effects in EnResNet.
The memory consumption is one of the major bottlenecks in training ultra-large DNNs.
Another advantage of our framework is that we can train small models and integrate them during
testing.
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